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GARNER v. UNITED STATES: SELF-INCRIMINATION
AND THE USE OF TAX RETURNS IN NONTAX
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS-THE NINTH
CIRCUIT ATTEMPTS A BALANCING
ACT
Currently, 75 million individuals file federal tax returns an-
nually.1 Few of these taxpayers consider the possibility that the in-
formation they report could be used against them in criminal prose-
cutions, not only for violation of the tax laws, but for all prosecutions
by both federal and state authorities. The legality of such usage, de-
spite the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, has been
consistently upheld by the federal courts.' It is therefore with obvious,
if unknowing, relief that taxpayers may greet a recent decision of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On June 5, 1972, that court decided
Garner v. United States,3 a precedent shattering decision which, if al-
lowed to stand, will significantly curtail the use of tax returns in non-
tax-related criminal prosecutions.
Roy D. Garner was tried in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California on a two count indictment. He was
convicted on count one, which charged a conspiracy to violate federal
statutes prohibiting the transmission of wagering information, 4 the in-
terstate travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, 5 and
perjury in sporting events.6 A motion for judgment of acquittal was
granted on the second count, which charged Garner with aiding and
1. This figure represents the average number of returns filed in the 1970 and
1971 calendar years for the 1969 and 1970 tax years. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
STATISTCS OT INco ME-1970 INlivmuAL INcoum-Tx RETuRNs 2 (1972 Preliminary
Report).
2. See text accompanying notes 23-98 infra.
3. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972), petition for
rehearing denied, Sept. 11, 1972, petition for rehearing granted, Dec. 13, 1972, sub-
mission for writ of prohibition staying Appellate Court proceedings granted, sub nom.
Garner v. Chambers, 41 U.S.L.W. (U.S. March 20, 1973) (No. 72-1171). This case
remains unreported to the date of this writing.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970).
5. Id. § 1952.
6. Id. § 224.
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abetting another in a substantive violation.7  At trial the government
introduced into evidence Garner's individual income tax returns for the
years 1965, 1966 and 1967. Virtually all his income in those years
was reported as derived from gambling, and this apparently convinced
the jury that Garner had been engaged in the business of betting and
wagering-an essential element in transmission of wagering informa-
tion.8 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that in prosecutions unre-
lated to the income tax laws, the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination allows a defendant to object to the subsequent prose-
cutorial use of his income tax returns absent the showing of a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the privilege when the return was filed.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "Enlo person shall . . . be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . ."I
The privilege has been labeled as reflective of many fundamental val-
ues and most noble aspirations.' 0 These include the unwillingness to
subject those suspected of crime to choose between self-incrimination,
perjury or contempt, dislike for an inquisitiorial system of criminal jus-
tice, fear that an individual will be coerced into self-incriminatory state-
ments, requiring the government to shoulder the entire burden of pros-
ecution, distrust of self-deprecatory statements, and respect for the in-
violability of the human personality." On the other hand, such rea-
sons are often said to be mere judicial gloss, and the real policies be-
hind the privilege identified as the need to preserve morality in gov-
ernment and protection of the right to privacy.'"
Historically, the privilege was available only to the accused party'3
or witnesses' 4 in criminal proceedings, but its scope is expanding to
include testimony given to administrative agencies' 5 and congressional
committees,' " as well as testimony in civil proceedings. 7 In 1964, the
7. Brief for Appellee at 2, Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir.,
June 5, 1972).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an historical analysis of the privilege against
self-incrimination see L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); Morgan,
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949).
10. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
11. Couch v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 611, 615-16 (1973), quoting from Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
12. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUPREME CT. REV.
193, 214.
13. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 116, at 248 (2nd ed. 1972).
14. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 76 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
15. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894). See generally Lilienthal, The Power
of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony, 39 HARV. L. REV. 694 (1926).
16. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. United States, 349
U.S. 190 (1955); Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955). See generally The
Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HtARv. L. REV. 119, 131 (1955): Note, 49 COLUM.
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Supreme Court employed the due process clause to hold the privilege
applicable to state prosecutions."8
Against this background and expansion, there were three judi-
cially promulgated rules concerning the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and its relation to government required information prior to
Garner.19 One rule stemmed from the Marchetti line of cases and
precluded the enforcement of a self-disclosure statute which is directed
at an inherently suspect group in a field of inquiry permeated with
criminal statutes.20  The second rule was the "required records" doc-
trine or the Shapiro rule. Under that rule, the government could use
information which had "public aspects," was customarily kept, and
was in an essentially regulatory field of inquiry.2" Finally, the Sullivan
rule required disclosure of information by individuals involved in a
legitimate field of governmental inquiry.22  This note will discuss the
nature and vitality of these three rules and their application to Garner,
the possibility that Garner establishes a new rule, and the nature, foun-
dation and implications of such a new rule.
Pre-Garner Doctrines Concerning the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and Government Required
Information
The Marchetti Rule
The Supreme Court, in reversing the convictions in Marchetti v.
United States,2" Grosso v. United States2  and Haynes v. United
L. REv. 87, 90-94 (1949).
17. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 437 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). See,
e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355 (1923) (bankruptcy), aff'd on rehearing,
266 U.S. 34 (1924).
18. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
19. Powell & Jones, Self-Incrimination and Fair Play-Marchetti, Grosso, and
Haynes Examined, 18 Am. U.L REv. 114, 119 (1968); Note, 21 BUFFALo L. REv. 509,
512-16 (1972).
20. See text accompanying notes 23-61 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 62-90 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 91-103 infra.
23. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had af-
firmed convictions under two indictments. The first averred that defendant and others
conspired to evade the annual occupational tax on gamblers, and the second alleged
a willful failure both to pay the occupational tax and to register before engaging in
the business of accepting wagers.
24. 390 U.S. 62 (1968). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had af-
firmed convictions for willful failure to pay the excise tax on wagering, for the occu-
pational tax imposed, and for conspiracy to defraud the government by evading pay-
ment of both taxes.
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States,2  held that the privilege against self-incrimination is a complete
defense to any criminal charges arising incident to noncompliance with
registration statutes.2" This rule was held to apply, however, only
when compliance with the statute would be a significant link in the
chain of evidence tending to establish guilt.21 Although the facts in
Garner did not warrant application of the Marchetti rule, an under-
standing of the rule is essential because the Garner court relied heavily
on its reasoning in barring the use, in a subsequent nontax criminal
proceeding, of the defendant's income tax returns.
To invoke the Marchetti rule three essential components must be
present. First, the registration or disclosure must operate in a field
of conduct permeated with statutes prescribing criminal sanctions. Sec-
ond, the statute must be directed at individuals who are considered
inherently suspect of criminal activities. Finally, the danger of in-
crimination presented by the statute must be "real and appreciable."2
Upon establishing these prerequisites, an individual can entirely resist
registration by asserting his privilege against self-incrimination.
Threshold discussion of the rule is necessary because Marchetti sig-
nificantly modified the two previous doctrines pertaining to the priv-
ilege when related to government-required information. The Courts of
Appeals in Marchetti and Grosso affirmed convictions by relying on
United States v. Kahriger29 and Lewis v. United States,3" and as the
Supreme Court reversed those convictions, it overruled pro tanto both
of the latter cases.
In Kahriger, the Court found constitutional federal statutes im-
posing an occupational tax on gamblers and requiring registration with
the Internal Revenue Service before engaging in the business of accept-
ing wagers. 31  The Supreme Court held that the wagering tax statutes
presented no compulsion to the potential registrant. There was, argued
Kahriger, no compulsion to confess to the present or past acts to which
25. 390 U.S. 85 (1968). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
conviction for a National Firearms Act violation; i.e., that defendant knowingly pos-
sessed a firearm which had not been registered with the Secretary of the Treasury.
26 U.S.C. § 5841 (1970).
26. A registration statute commands an individual to register or submit informa-
tion to an appropriate governmental agency under penalty for noncompliance. E.g.,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4412 (registration as a gambler); INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 5841 (registration of firearms).
27. See 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968).
28. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
29. 345 U.S. 22, rehearing denied, 345 U.S. 931 (1953).
30. 348 U.S. 419, rehearing denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955).
31. The information charging Kahriger with violation of these federal statutes
had been dismissed by the district court. The court held the statutes unconstitutional
as a usurpation of the state's police power. United States v. Kahriger, 105 F. Supp.
322 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
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the privilege specifically applied. Instead, the wagering tax statutes
were prospective in their application-merely prescribing the condi-
tions precedent to engaging in a particular activity. 2
In Lewis,33 the Court relied on Kahriger to support the proposi-
tion that the wagering tax statute was applicable only to future acts.34
As to the statutory compulsion, the Court found that a waiver of the
privilege against self-incrimination was necessarily implied from the
defendant's conduct. The only compulsion under the statute related to
the initial choice made at the commencement of the wagering activities.
As such, held Lewis, the act did not compel self-incrimination:3 5
"They may have to give up gambling, but there is no constitutional
right to gamble." 6 Following the reasoning of Lewis, when individuals
engage in an activity subject to registration statutes which provide for
self-disclosure concerning that activity, they do so at the cost of their
Fifth Amendment rights. Since the initial decision to gamble was
voluntary, the disclosures required by the statute are similarly volun-
tary, and consequently not within the purview of the constitutional
privilege.
3 7
In Marchetti, the Court held the reasoning employed in Kahriger
and Lewis no longer persuasive, 38 in that those cases declared the
privilege against self-incrimination to be solely retrospective in applica-
tion. The basic deficiency found was that the chronological formula
was too inflexible, and that if perpetuated it would abrogate the basic
policies behind the constitutional privilege. Withdrawal of this priv-
ilege in regard to future conduct, said Marchetti, would unduly limit
its protection. The Court concluded that "it is not mere time to which
the law must look, but to the substantiality of the risks of incrimina-
tion." 9  The Court also held the reasoning of Kahriger and Lewis to
be lacking in a second, more practical respect-that is, payment of the
occupational tax and the registration requirement was applicable only
to future acts, thus overlooking the hazards of incrimination as to past
or present acts.4" Compliance with the statutory provisions would
32. 345 U.S. at 32-33.
33. Lewis had been charged with professionally accepting wagers without pay-
ing the requisite occupational tax. The trial court had granted a motion to dismiss.
United States v. Lewis, 100 A.2d 40, 41 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953).
34. 348 U.S. at 422.
35. Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1955).
36. Id.
37. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51 (1968).
38. If the privilege against self-incrimination is denied to one who has "volun-
tarily" engaged in criminal behavior then the protection of the privilege is withdrawn
from those who it was designed to protect. Id.
39. Id. at 54.
40. Id. at 52.
plainly increase the likelihood of discovery and successful prosecution
for past or present offenses, 4 ' because it would center attention upon
the gambler and aid in the collection of admissible evidence.4" Com-
pliance would also disclose anticipated conduct which directly con-
flicts with the protection of the individual's right to privacy, a basic
policy goal behind the privilege.
43
The Marchetti line of cases holds the privilege against self-in-
crimination to be a complete defense to compulsory schemes of self-
disclosure, at least in cases where that scheme operates in an area per-
meated with criminal statutes and concerns a group inherently suspect
of criminal activities.44 In this way, Marchetti applies the approach
announced by the Supreme Court in Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board.45  In Albertson, the petitioners resisted an order di-
recting them-as members of a Communist-action organization-to
file a registration statement46 with the appropriate governmental agency.
The Court held the order unenforceable since the registration was un-
constitutional as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.4"
Another barrier to invocation of the privilege requires that the
danger of incrimination must be "real and appreciable."48  Should the
hazards prove to be nothing more than "imaginary and unsubstantial,"
the privilege will not apply. 9 Nevertheless, the Marchetti filing of the
wagering excise tax return, and the obligation to pay the excise tax,
met the "appreciable danger" requirement."0
41. The Court through Mr. Justice Harlan makes it clear that these offenses are
not limited to those involving actual gambling, but may extend to custody or transpor-
tation of gambling equipment, or other preparations for gambling activity. Id.
42. Id.
43. See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
44. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (Marchetti not
applied retroactively for postconviction relief); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969) (Marchetti reasoning applied to the Marijuana Tax Act).
45. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
46. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, § 8, 64 Stat. 995.
47. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 77-79 (1965).
48. E.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968); Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62, 66-67 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 97 (1968).
49. See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (possibility of incrimina-
tion under state law was imaginary and unsubstantial in light of federal immunity
statute); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (after petitioner's admission
that she held office of Treasurer of the Communist Party of Denver the disclosure of
acquaintance with her successor presented no more than a mere possibility of increas-
ing the danger of prosecution). This requirement originated in the old English deci-
sion of Queen v. Boyes, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (K.B. 1861).
50. 390 U.S. at 54; accord, Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1968).
Similarly, in Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), compliance with the regis-
tration provisions of the National Firearms Act was held to create more than a re-
mote possibility of criminal prosecution. Id. at 97.
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In an analogous situation, the Court in California v. Byers51 was
faced with the question of whether the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was impinged upon by California's "hit and run" statute. 52 The
statute in question requires the driver of a motor vehicle to stop at
the scene of the accident and give his name and address. The Court
found no constitutional violation because only possibility of incrimina-
tion existed;53 as such the "hit and run" statute did not entail the sub-
stantial risks of self-incrimination involved in Marchetti.54 The judg-
ment involves the matter of degree to which the individual's claim to
constitutional protection will be balanced against the public need for
information.55
Applying the Marchetti rule to the factual situation in Garner, it
is clear that Garner would not have been wholly excused from filing
his income tax returns5 6-none of the three essential components are
present.57  The statute requiring self-disclosure of information is not
directed at a group inherently suspect of criminal activities. It is,
rather, directed at the public at large.58 Second, the field of inquiry is
not permeated with criminal statutes, although the Internal Revenue
Code does define some criminal offenses.59 Finally, compliance with
the return requirements would create only the mere possibility of in-
crimination, thereby failing to meet the "appreciable danger" require-
ment.60 Although not applicable to the fact situation, Garner relied
heavily on Marchetti. As discussed below, Garner adopts the Marchetti
reasoning to invalidate the finding of an implied waiver of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. 61
The "Required Records" Doctrine
Perhaps coexisting with the Marchetti rule is the "required rec-
ords" doctrine which, when operative, eliminates the privilege against
51. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
52. CAL. VEH. CODE § 20002(a)(1) (West 1971).
53. Id. at 428. "[Unlikely possibilities present only 'imaginary and insubstan-
tial' hazards of incrimination, rather than 'real and appreciable' risks needed to sup-
port a Fifth Amendment claim." Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1969).
54. 402 U.S. at 431.
55. Id. at 427. Concurring in the opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan believed that
where a self-reporting scheme was essential to the government's regulatory purpose,
the alternative of leaving it unenforceable whenever a Fifth Amendment claim was
made was unacceptable. Id. at 440-43, 452 (Harlan, J., concurring).
56. Note, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 398, 401 (1968).
57. See text accompanying notes 23-37 supra.
58. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7201-7216.
60. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971).
61. See text accompanying notes 124-145 infra.
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self-incrimination with respect to statutorily required records. The
privilege may only be asserted by a natural person with respect to his
private documents.2 Thus, the privilege may not be claimed for cor-
porate records,6 3 partnership records, 64 or unincorporated associations
such as labor unions.65 The continued vitality of this doctrine at the
present time is in doubt, and in any case, its applicability to income tax
returns is questionable.
The genesis of the required records doctrine was the 1886 case of
Boyd v. United States,66 where the Court held unconstitutional on
Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds a statute6 7 authorizing the pro-
duction of private papers. The Court stated in dictum, however, that
those records statutorily required could not be brought within the same
constitutional protections.6 8  This dictum was given decisional foun-
dation in Wilson v. United States,69 where the Court held that an offi-
cer of a corporation, with custody of corporate records, could not re-
fuse to produce them pursuant to a court order.
The leading case applying the required records doctrine was Sha-
piro v. United States.70  The appellant was a wholesale produce dealer,
and regulations under the Emergency Price Control Act of 194271 re-
quired him to keep and make available for examination such records
as he customarily maintained in his business. Appellant produced
these records in compliance wtih a subpoena duces tecum and was
later convicted of having made tie-in sales in violation of the act. The
62. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2259 (McNaughton rev. 1961); see Couch v.
United States, 93 S. Ct. 611, 616 (1973).
63. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380-85 (1911); Grant v. United
States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913). But cf. Application of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.
N.Y. 1956) (alien corporation not subject to jurisdiction of United States and thus
sole stockholder held the corporate records in a purely personal capacity). For a
criticism of this rule in relation to corporate records see Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924,
925-29 (9th Cir.) (Madden, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964). See
generally Annot., 154 A.L.R. 279 (1945); Note, 78 HARV. L. REV. 455 (1964).
64. United States v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1946) (limited part-
nership). Contra, United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
aff'd 355 U.S. 339, rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 967 (1958). See generally 63 COLtMI.
L. REV. 1319 (1963).
65. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944).
66. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
67. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 187.
68. "[T]he supervision authorized .. .over . . . books required by law to be
kept for .. . inspection, are necessarily excepted out of the category of unreasonable
searches and seizures." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886). Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) recognized this as a principle of law. Id. at
33-34 & n. 42.
69. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
70. 335 U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 836 (1948).
71. Law of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 202(b), 56 Stat. 23.
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Supreme Court affirmed in a five to four decision, holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination cannot be claimed by defendants
compelled to produce those business records required by statute.
Marchetti and Grosso distinguished Shapiro, holding the required
records doctrine inapplicable to the cases at hand.72  Justice Brennan,
in his concurring opinion, stated that "nothing we decide or say today
in any wise impairs or modifies. . .Shapiro v. United States. . .."73
A number of authorities, however, believe Shapiro relied on an implied
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. 74 Since Marchetti
directly questions the propriety of inferring an implied waiver of a con-
stitutional right from the circumstances, it raises considerable doubt
concerning Shapiro's continued vitality.
75
Assuming arguendo that Shapiro is still good law, its application
to income tax returns and records is questionable. Three requirements
define the bounds of the required records doctrine: the United States'
inquiry must be essentially regulatory, the records required to be kept
must be those customarily preserved, and the records themselves must
have assumed "public aspects. '7 6  It is by no means clear that income
tax returns satisfy the aforementioned requirements to the extent nec-
essary to bring the information they contain within the purview of the
doctrine.
The internal revenue laws, which are directed at the public at
large, have as their principal purpose the collection of tax monies. 77
Although the Internal Revenue Code does define some criminal of-
fenses,78 the primary thrust of the code is not prosecutorial but regu-
latory.79 If considered essentially regulatory, the first requirement for
the application of the required records doctrine is satisfied.80
72. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 56-57 (1968); Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-69 (1968).
73. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 72 (1968) (Brennan, J., concurring).
74. Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHr. L. REv. 687, 712 (1951); The Supreme Court, 1970
Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 38, 273 (1971); Note, 68 HARv. L. RFv. 340, 343 (1954);
Note, 63 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 398, 404 (1968); see Note, 3 Anx. L. RFv. 214 (1949).
75. 390 U.S. at 51-52. See text accompanying notes 124-139 infra.
76. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968).
77. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) ("hit and run" statute com-
pared with income tax laws).
78. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7201-16.
79. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). But see id. at 460
(Black, J., dissenting).
80. One writer has criticized this requirement. Mansfield, The Albertson Case:
Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need
for Information, 1966 SUPREME CT. Rnv. 103. The author states: "It is hard to
imagine how ... any argument can be made to turn on the importance of the gov-
ernmental objective sought to be achieved ... that could constitutionally justify set-
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The Internal Revenue Code imposes a duty on all taxpayers to
keep records which will support the returns they file,8 ' and the Internal
Revenue Service may require that a person "keep such records [as the
Service] deems sufficient." 82  If the information obtained from these
records satisfies the requirement that the records be those which are
"customarily kept," a taxpayer required to both file a return and keep
supporting records would be denied the protection of the privilege
against self-incrimination,83 and so far the courts have not extended
the required records doctrine into this area.8" To do so would require
the argument that a taxpayer would maintain these records absent the
pressure by the Internal Revenue Service, an argument of doubtful
validity.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that "[r]eturns made with
respect to taxes . . .shall constitute public records . . *.."I' Despite
this, however, access to the returns is severely limited both by the code
itself and the appropriate regulations.8 6 The question therefore arises
as to whether this statutory pronouncement satisfies the final require-
men of the required records doctrine that the records must have as-
sumed public aspects which render them analogous to public docu-
ments.8 7
ting aside the privilege. Only the war power, which may have had some influence on
the Shapiro decision, could conceivably support an argument sufficiently impressive to
warrant such a trontal assault on the privilege." Id. at 132.
81. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6001. These records are to be kept available for
inspection at all times and are to be retained by the taxpayer so long as their contents
are material. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(e) (1959).
82. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6001. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) (1959) pro-
vides that: "[Any person subject to tax . . . shall keep such permanent books of
account or records, including inventories, as are sufficient to establish the amount of
gross income, deductions, credits, or other matters required to be shown by such person
in any return of such tax . .. ."
83. See Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and tile Government's Need for Information, 1966 SUPREME CT.
REV. 103, 116; McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUPREME Cr.
REV. 193, 217; Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 687, 712 (1951). An alien registration
receipt card is not the type of record "customarily kept" although an alien eighteen
years old or older is required to have it in his possession at all times. United States
v. Campos-Serrano, 430 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404
U.S. 293 (1971).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Remolif, 227 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Nev. 1964)
(Shapiro was distinguished and held applicable only to the specific factual situation
involved); Blumberg v. United States, 222 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir., 1955) (dictum).
85. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6103(a).
86. See text accompanying notes 165-178 infra.
87. In Grosso v. United States the information demanded in the wagering ex-
cise tax return was said to lack every characteristic of a public document. 390 U.S.
at 68.
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Perhaps the best approach to the problem is that taken by Justice
Frankfurter, acknowledging that "records required to be kept by law
are not necessarily public in any except a word-playing sense. To de-
termine whether such records are truly public . . .we have to take
into account their custody, their subject matter, and the use sought to
be made of them.""8  In view of the limitations upon access to the
returns,89 and the confidential nature90 of the information they contain,
it is difficult even in the face of statutory pronouncement to consider
them "public records."
In sum, the applicability of the required records doctrine to in-
come tax returns and records is questionable. It is doubtful that the
second and third requirements of the doctrine will be satisfied-that
is, the records are those customarily preserved and that they have as-
sumed "public aspects." Moreover, the vitality of the required records
doctrine, if based on the notion of implied waiver, is clouded by the
Marchetti decision. Marchetti repudiates the finding of an implied
waiver of a constitutional right without a careful examination of the
attendant circumstances.
The Sullivan Rule
Of the three rules regarding government required information,
the one enunciated in United States v. Sullivan91 is most nearly appli-
cable to the Garner situation. In Sullivan, the Supreme Court faced
for the first time92 the issue of self-incrimination in the filing of an in-
come tax return. Sullivan accumulated 1921 income sufficient to re-
quire that he file a return, which disclosed that most of his income
resulted from violations of the National Prohibition Act.93 A convic-
88. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 56 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
A suggested meaning of "public aspects" is records which are usually known to the
public in general rather than records which are essentially personal to the individual.
United States v. Campos-Serrano, 430 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 293 (1971). See generally The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82
HARv. L. Rav. 95, 201 (1968).
89. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE Op 1954, § 6103 (limitations on disclosure of in-
formation as to persons filing income tax returns).
90. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-100 (1961) (providing for inspection
by Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with information thus obtained
to be confidential); Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-101 (1961) (providing for inspection
by congressional committees with information thus obtained to be confidential).
91. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
92. The cases cited by the Court on the self-incrimination issue were unrelated
to the income tax laws. They were: Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917)
(testimony before grand jury); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Im-
migration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) (proceedings before immigration authorities).
93. The facts described are those reported in the court of appeals opinion. 15
F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1926).
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tion of willful failure to file an income tax return was reversed by the
Fourth Circuit on the sole ground that a requirement to file a return
violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege. The statute in
question, according to the Fourth Circuit, required disclosures of illegal
activity but failed to provide immunity to the extent demanded by the
Fifth Amendment.94
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, declared
that such an interpretation stretched the Fifth Amendment protection
too far. 5  A person may not refuse to make any return at all simply
because some of the questions in the return call for incriminating an-
swers.96 The Court also stated, by way of dictum, that a person wish-
ing to claim his Fifth Amendment privilege should do so in the re-
turn.9 7 These two elements of Sullivan-the necessity of filing a return
and the requirement that the privilege be claimed therein-are sup-
ported by separate policies and apply to Garner in different ways.
The first element has been broadly interpreted to mean that a
citizen may not refuse to respond to legitimate government inquiries
simply because some of the questions may be incriminating. 98  Read in
the light of Marchetti, Sullivan holds that in an essentially neutral field
of inquiry, such as income taxation of the public at large, a person
cannot refuse to answer, at the least, the netural questions asked: "[A]
self-incrimination claim against every question on the tax return, or
based on the mere submission of the return, would be virtually friv-
olous . . . ."' This element of the Sullivan decision, as important
as it is to the existence of the income tax system, is not determinative
of the issue raised in Garner regarding the use of information supplied
to the government. It simply means that Garner would not have had
Fifth Amendment grounds for refusing to file any return at all.
The second element of Sullivan, in dictum, holds that objection
to specific questions based on self-incrimination grounds should be
claimed in the return itself. This dictum was noted in Judge Wallace's
dissenting opinion in Garner as authority for claiming that "[the]
Fifth Amendment privilege must be asserted when the income tax re-
94. Id. at 811-13.
95. 274 U.S. at 263.
96. Id. at 263-64.
97. Id.
98. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1, 198 (Brennan, J., dissenting), rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961);
Powell & Jones, Self-Incrimination and Fair Play-Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes
Examined, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 114, 119-20 (1968).
99. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965) (com-
menting on Sullit an); accord, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 50 (1968).
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turn is filed, not at the time of subsequent prosecution."'10 The justi-
fication for this reading of Sullivan was the much repeated statement:
"[T]o honor the claim of privilege not asserted at the time a return
was due would make the taxpayer rather than the tribunal the final
arbiter of the merits of the claim.'
10 1
This reasoning may be valid in a situation like Sullivan where
no return was filed, but it fails to be convincing where the govern-
ment already has the return and is seeking to use the information re-
ported in it for prosecutions unrelated to the income tax laws. The in-
criminating nature of the disclosures, after all, has already been placed
before the court. The Sullivan dictum has been noted in numerous
subsequent cases' 02 but never has been applied as Judge Wallace sug-
gests-to bar a subsequent invocation of the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege.
In summation, the three major lines of cases in regard to gov-
ernment required information all fail to provide a rule to govern the
Garner decision. The Marchetti line of cases restrict their holdings
to those areas permeated with criminal statutes and concerned with
groups inherently suspect of criminal activity, and the income tax laws
do not fall within these boundaries. The required records doctrine
not only has questionable application to income tax returns, but the
doctrine itself has been significantly undermined. The Sullivan rule,
finally, fails to reach the issue in doubt-the governmental use of in-
formation supplied in the return. The Garner court noted:
What Sullivan left open, and what no Supreme Court case has
yet decided, is this question: to what extent and under what cir-
cumstances may incriminating information supplied by a taxpayer
in an income tax return be used against the taxpayer in a criminal
prosecution unrelated to the income tax laws?' 0 3
Promulgation of a New Rule
Though no prior Supreme Court rulings were determinative of
the admissibility of Garner's tax returns, the Ninth Circuit considered
one of its prior cases, 0 4 together with those of the Fifth and Sev-
enth Circuits, 0 5 in making its decision. Those cases supported the ad-
100. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 10 (em-
phasis added).
101. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965) (com-
menting on Sullivan).
102. See, e.g., Reyes v. United States, 258 F.2d 774, 780-83 n.4 (9th Cir. 1958);
Benetti v. United States, 97 F.2d 263, 267 (9th Cir. 1938).
103. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972).
104. Stillman v. United States, 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1949).
105. Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
574 (1941) (use of income tax returns in prosecution for mail fraud); Grimes v.
missibility of the returns. Garner, however, determined that they did
so on the theory of an implied waiver of the privilege against self-in-
crimination, and proceeded to find that the Marchetti line of cases" 6
had repudiated that theory. This finding is the operative crux of
Garner, but before reaching that discussion the Court declared that the
admissibility of the disclosures was to be determined by an examination
of the circumstances under which they were made. Since the Fifth
Amendment protects only against compelled self-incrimination, the
Ninth Circuit began by examining the nature of the compulsion in-
volved.
07
To insure the effective enforcement of the internal revenue laws
Congress provided a comprehensive system of civil penalties'0 " and
criminal sanctions' °9 under the Internal Revenue Code. In addition to
United States, 379 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967) (use of
income tax returns in a prosecution for traveling and use of the mails in interstate
commerce to promote a gambling scheme); United States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577
(7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
106. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 3-4 & n.4.
107. Id. at 4.
108. The civil penalties are graduated to concur with the seriousness of the of-
fense. The failure to file a return, in the absence of reasonable cause, will result in
a penalty of five percent of the tax due for each month delinquent, but the total pen-
alty may not exceed twenty-five percent of the tax due. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6651(a)(1). If the failure to pay the tax is because of negligence or intentional dis-
regard of the rules and regulations, but not fraud, five percent is added to the de-
linquency, in addition to the penalties under section 6651(a)(1). Id. § 6653(a). If
the underpayment is due to fraud, there is an addition to the tax of fifty percent.
Id. § 6653(b). If the fraud penalty is imposed, the sanctions under section 6651 are
not applied. Id. § 6653(d). In all cases six percent simple interest is provided for on
the amount of the tax from the date due until paid. Id. § 6601(a).
109. The principal criminal sanction contained in the Internal Revenue Code
makes it a felony to willfully attempt to evade or defeat taxes. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 7201. This section sets forth two separate offenses; first, a willful attempt
to evade the tax; and second, the willful attempt to evade the payment of the tax.
To be convicted under this statute there must be willfulness, an existing tax de-
ficiency, and affirmative action constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax.
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965). An attempt is a separate
crime for each year such an attempt is made. See cases collected at 10 J. MERTENS,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 55A.02, n.17.1 (1970 rev.).
Violation of the administrative provisions of the code, such as willful failure to
pay tax, keep records, file a required return, or supply information, is punishable as a
misdemeanor. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7203. To be convicted under this statute
for willful failure to file a return, the government must prove that the defendant
was required by law to make a return for the year in question, that he failed to file
the return at the time required by law, and that the failure was willful. Schmidt &
Thatcher, Lesser Included Income Tax Offenses, 16 TAX L. REV. 463, 474 (1961).
The prosecution may be maintained even though there is no tax due. Spies v. United
States, 317 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1943); United States v. Matosky, 421 F.2d 410, 413 (7th
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the criminal sanctions contained in the code, supplementary and com-
plementary sanctions are found in Title 18 of the United States Code.110
These sanctions, according to the court, are substantial.
Garner, moreover, notes another variety of compulsion partially
economic in operation. To qualify for particular deductions and losses,
the Internal Revenue Service must be provided with information show-
ing whether the taxpayer qualifies. For instance, a gambler may only
deduct gambling losses to the extent of gambling profits. Further-
more, the failure of a gambler to disclose this information, would
subject him to prosecution for perjury or tax evasion.' In the case
of a person with a large amount of gambling income the financial
impact could be quite substantial. The Supreme Court has held that
the unlawfulness of the activity does not prevent its taxation"2 and an
income's illegal nature will therefore pose no bar to its taxation. 113
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970). For the requirement of willfulness see
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1173 (1968).
A taxpayer may be prosecuted for perjury, a felony under the code. INT. R.Ev.
CODE OF 1954, § 7206(1). Elements of this offense are a willful making and sub-
scribing of a return, statement or other document containing a written declaration that
it is made under penalty of perjury, and the maker can not believe that that document
is true and correct as to every material matter. See, e.g., United States v. Rayor,
204 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D. Cal. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964); United
States v. Accardo, 61-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 79,423, 79,427 (N.D. Ill. 1960), rev'd and re-
manded on other grounds, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962).
Misdemeanor sanctions are also provided for willfully delivering or disclosing re-
turns, documents, or disclosures which are false as to any material matter. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7207. This section is applicable to income tax returns.
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 347-49 (1965). See generally Morris, Cur-
rent Criminal Sanctions of the Internal Revenue Code, 27 J. Mo. B. 388 (1971).
110. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 287 (false, fictitious or fraudulent claims); Id. § 371
(conspiracy to commit an offense or to defraud the United States); Id. § 1001 (false
statement); Id. § 1621 (perjury). The government may choose to invoke a sanction
under either Title 18, United States Code, or the Internal Revenue Code. See
Rosenburg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 294 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring).
111. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 5-6. The
Code provides that wagering losses may be deducted only to the extent of the gains.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(d). The excess of the losses over the gains may not
be deducted in the current year, and the excess may not be carried over to succeeding
years. Skeeles v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 242, 245 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Annie L.
Strawder, 17 T.C. Mem. 406, 413 (1958), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 277
F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1950); Roy T. Offutt, 16 T.C. 1214, 1215 (1951). The fact that
gambling losses exceed gambling gains does not mean that the transaction need not
be reported. McClanahan v. United States, 292 F.2d 630, 631-32 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961); Clyde F. Powell, 18 T.C. Mem. 170, 175 (1959);
Louis Halle, 7 T.C. 245 (1946), affd 175 F.2d 500 (2nd Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 949 (1950).
112. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968); see License Tax Cases,
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1867).
113. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961-) (extortion); -Rutkin
Gambling income, in fact, has been specifically held subject to the
federal income tax. 114
The Garner court considered such statutory directives sufficient
to amount to compulsory disclosure. Such measures, said the court,
surrounded Garner with a pervasive system of civil sanctions and crim-
inal penalties, like a series of closed escapeways. He would be subject
to prosecution had he not filed a return, or filed a return which was
incomplete. To further complete this circle, the incriminating nature
of the disclosures would not justify him in submitting false returns. 115
Garner and Implied Waiver
There is, of course, the final possibility for escape expressed by
Justice Homes in the Sullivan decision: Garner could have claimed
his Fifth Amendment privilege on the return. 116 The dissenting opin-
ion, in fact, concluded that failure to claim the privilege when the re-
turn was filed constituted a waiver." 7  The majority opinion, on the
other hand, countered the argument by attacking generally the implied
waiver concept as applied to constitutional rights."
8
The question thus faced by the Garner court was this: if Garner
revealed the source of his income in compliance with statutory compul-
sion, assuming that he was not aware of his right to object to submit-
ting such information, did he thereby waive his right to object to the
use of the incriminating disclosures? In Stillman v. United States,"19
the Ninth Circuit precedent on this issue, the answer was affirmative;1
20
Garner, however, re-evaluated and ultimately overruled that decision.'
2 '
In Stillman, defendants' income tax returns were used against them, in
a prosecution for violating the wartime Emergency Price Control Act,
to prove the amount of income unlawfully earned. Appealing the con-
victions, objections to such usage on Fifth Amendment grounds were
rejected on the ground that disclosures on the tax returns were "volun-
v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) (same).
114. See, e.g., James P. McKenna, 1 B.T.A. 326, 330 (1925). INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 61(a) provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source
derived. .. ."
115. United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 82 (1969).
116. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927) (dictum). See text
accompanying notes 91-103 supra.
117. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 10
(Wallace, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 3-4, 6-8. See text accompanying notes 158-163 infra for a discussion
of what may constitute a waiver in the light of Garner.
119. 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1949).
120. ld. at 617-18.
121. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 4.
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tarily entered upon a public record.' 122  The Stillman concept of vol-
untariness, however, can be deduced from the court's statement:
"[Tihey chose to report the illicit income rather than risk possible
prosecution for making false or incomplete returns ....
Garner concluded that Stillman had applied the concept of im-
plied waiver to the disclosures, and that in light of recent constitu-
tional developments the concept "has no place where the issue involves
the assertion of a constitutional right. .... "2' The Garner court
specifically refered to Marchetti, but Judge Wallace's dissent concluded
that Sullivan, and not Marchetti, should have applied. As discussed
above, neither of these decisions control, but what the majority opinion
recognized-and the dissent did not-is that Marchetti represents the
significant growth of the Fifth Amendment's protection since both Sul-
livan and Stillman. It is the continuing process of this growth into
which Garner fits and upon which it depends.
Since well before the adoption of Fifth Amendment the Anglo-
American system of justice has recognized the privilege of a criminal
defendant to refuse to testify against himself.125  On the other hand,
the system has also favored the establishment of guilt by the use of
confessions. 28  Persons accused of crime were and still are encouraged,
both by threats and promises, to make pre-trial admissions. The con-
flict in these interests of the criminal justice system, between protecting
the individual and expediting the prosecution, was frequently resolved
in favor of admitting the self-incriminating statements of the accused
by establishing that they were "voluntarily" given.'2 7  This manner
of both formulating and resolving the conflict is primarily meaningful
only as a test of testimonial trustworthiness, and hardly at all as a test
of whether a defendant's basic rights have been violated. Nonethe-
less, with rare exception, 12 8 the courts of the United States continued
to use this formulation of the conflict long after the adoption of the
Fifth Amendment.
In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court squarely confronted these cross-
purposes within the criminal justice system and attempted to rectify
122. Stillman v. United States, 177 F.2d 607, 618 (9th Cir. 1949).
123. Id.
124. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 4.
125. For an historical interpretation by the Supreme Court of the Fifth Amend-
ment's background and meaning see Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541-561
(1897); and, for an up-date of this analysis see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
458-67 (1966).
126. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-81 (1966).
127. See id. at 457.
128. E.g., Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Wan v. United States,
266 U.S. 1 (1924).
what it considered to be an imbalance in favor of the prosecution. In
Miranda v. Arizona,'29 the Court decided that the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee against compelled self-incrimination attaches to a criminal
suspect as soon as he is taken into custody or is otherwise significantly
deprived of his freedom of action. 3 ' In all future criminal trials, the
Court said, by both state and federal authorities, the pre-trial state-
ments of a defendant will not be admissible to establish guilt' 3 ' unless
the accused is fully informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
the advice of counsel.' 32  Due process requires that testimonial evi-
dence be voluntary, but the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination establishes the entirely distinct requirement that a de-
fendant need not make any statement to authorities, either at trial or
before. Henceforth, the admissibility of any statements by the accused
must pass both tests. The defendant must be fully and adequately
informed of his right to remain silent, and all statements made after
such a warning must be free of coercion. Indeed, the burden is upon
the prosecution to demonstrate that these constitutional safeguards have
been satisfied. 133  In particular, the Court said, a finding of waiver of
the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be presumed from a si-
lent record. Evidence must be presented, and the record must show
compliance with these requirements.1
34
In the 1968 Marchetti line of cases, 35 the Supreme Court enun-
ciated a similar judicial scrutiny of Fifth Amendment waivers with re-
gard to federal gambling registration statutes. A person who engaged
in gambling activity, but failed to register as required by the statute,
could not be prosecuted for that failure. Despite previous Supreme
Court decisions 136 that person retained his privilege not to incriminate
himself. A judicial finding of waiver of the privilege by inferring an
antecedent choice by the accused between retaining his constitutional
privilege and engaging in gambling activity without registering was not
permissible:
Such inferences, bottomed on what must ordinarily be a fic-
tion, have precisely the infirmities which the Court has found in
129. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
130. Id. at 444.
131. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Supreme Court decided
that pre-trial admissions of a defendant taken in violation of the Miranda guidelines
were admissible as impeaching evidence if the accused took the stand in his own de-
fense.
132. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
133. Id. at 475.
134. Id.
135. See discussion of these cases in text accompanying notes 23-61 supra.
136. Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955); United States v. Kahriger,
345 U.S. 22 (1953).
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other circumstances in which implied or uninformed waivers of
the privileges have been said to have occurred .... To give
credence to such "waivers" without the most deliberate examina-
tion of the circumstances surrounding them would ultimately




Garner employed this caveat against implied waivers and re-eval-
uated past judicial treatment of tax return disclosures in two important
respects. First, if there is no showing that an individual was informed
of his right to claim the privilege as to the disclosures in the return,
a waiver of the privilege will not be implied.13 In Garner the record
was silent regarding his knowledge of the right, and the finding of a
waiver was thus held to be impermissible.13 9
Second, if the disclosures were compelled to satisfy a noncriminal
(i.e., regulatory) purpose, that purpose cannot be later disregarded.
Should the government subsequently seek to use the disclosure to show
criminal conduct, such use will be precluded.140 This preclusion is
effectuated by the imposition of the exclusionary rule, or as termed by
some courts, a use restriction.14: ' The controlling factor in determining
such use, said the court, should be the individual's relinquishment of a
known right, not the government's need for information. 4 2 Implying
a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, merely by engaging
in activity subject to reporting requirements, was held to go too far.
Such a formulation, said the Ninth Circuit, "would allow comprehensive
schemes of self-reporting in non-criminal areas to become data banks
containing numerous 'admissions' of criminal activity, available without
limitation to prosecuting authorities.'
43
The Garner decision thus gives effect to a primary purpose of the
Fifth Amendment privilege-the preservation of individual privacy.,44
As Justice Douglas has said: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-In-
crimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
the government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.' 45
Garner therefore established a new rule regarding the relationship be-
137. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1968).
138. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 7-8.
139. Id. at 8.
140. Id. at 6-7.
141. See text accompanying notes 148-163 infra.
142. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 6-7.
143. Id. at 7.
144. See McKay, Self-Incrimitation and the New Privacy, 1967 SuPRnmz CT.
REv. 193, 210-14.
145. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (dictum).
tween government required tax information and the privilege against
self-incrimination: for such information to be admissible in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, not related to the internal revenue laws, a
true waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination must be shown.
No longer will the courts imply waiver from the mere filing of informa-
tion.
Implications of the Garner Rule
In the Garner situation, three possibilities exist for balancing the
informational needs of the government and the individual's privilege
against self-incrimination. The first is to hold the government's inter-
est paramount, abrogating the privilege in all areas where the govern-
ment has a legitimate regulatory interest. To so hold would destroy
the privilege in many areas where it is now effective through the use
of legislation designed to circumvent the constitutional protections. The
second is to abolish the requirement that taxpayers self-report their ille-
gal income. This possibility, however, overlooks the government's le-
gitimate regulatory interest and would doubtless result in substantial
tax advantages to those who make their living pursuing illegal activities.
The Supreme Court has previously rejected such a solution. 14 6 The
third solution is a judicially imposed use restriction in certain cases, the
solution espoused in Garner.'47 Employing this solution, courts would
prohibit prosecutorial use of income tax returns in nontax criminal
proceedings absent a showing that defendant knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his privilege against self-incrimination-in practical ef-
fect, an exclusionary rule.
The remainder of this note examines in two phases the implica-
tions of this use restriction-exclusionary rule established by Garner.
The first is to explore some of the facets of the rule; its nature, how
it is invoked in cases involving income tax returns, and how the prose-
cution may avoid its impact. The second phase is to assess the pro-
priety of establishing the use restriction, weighing its imposition by
standards set out by the Supreme Court.
Facets of the Use Restriction-Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule renders probative evidence inadmissible
when it is obtained as a consequence of law enforcement conduct viola-
tive of the Constitution. 4 " The Supreme Court has imposed the exclu-
146. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961).
147. The majority opinion in Garner nowhere specifically uses the term "use re-
striction" except in discussing California v. Byers. Garner v. United States, No.
71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 4-5. The dissenting opinion does use the ex-
pression in characterizing the majority's result. Id. at 11.
148. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Jones, Fruit of the Poisonous
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sionary rule for five types of violations: searches and seizures that vio-
late the Fourth Amendment, confessions obtained in violation of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, identification testimony obtained in vio-
lation of these amendments, evidence obtained by methods so shocking
that its use would violate the due process clause, and denial of the right
to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 149 The justification
given for the exclusionary rule is that it will act as a "deterrent safe-
guard,"'150 in that it will deter law enforcement officers from illegal'
behavior and improper practices.' 51 The exclusionary rule has, in
fact, been called the most effective means to "compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty . "..."'ll Garner extends the exclusionary
rule to evidence in an individual's income tax return obtained in viola-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination.
When applied to income tax returns and the information con-
tained therein, the exclusionary rule's invocation in a subsequent non-
tax-related prosecution may be based on either of two findings. The
first is a determination that the individual submitted the return without
waiving the privilege against self-incrimination or that the waiver failed
to meet the requirement of being knowingly and intelligently made.
The second is that the evidence submitted was acquired from the return
or derived from it as "fruit of a poisonous tree."' 53  This exclusion-
ary rule-use restriction was applied by Garner, and the result does not
Tree, 9 ST. TEx. LJ. 17 (1966). The exclusionary rule had its origin in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920). Mapp v. Ohio held that the exclusionary rule was an essential
part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment and was enforceable against the
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 367 U.S. at
655-60; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
149. See LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in
Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MicH. L. Rnv. 987 (1965);
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cmr. L. Rlv. 665
(1970).
150. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).
151. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); LaFave & Remington, Controll.ng the Police: The Judge's
Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MicH. L. Rav. 987,
1003 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Searches and Seizures, 37 U.
Cm. L. REv. 665, 671 (1970).
152. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1967), quoting from Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Mapp relied on People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
282 P.2d 905 (1955) to show that experience had shown that the other remedies avail-
able were "worthless and futile." 367 U.S. at 651-52. Contra, Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Berger, C.J., dissenting) (stat-
utory scheme proposed providing a remedy in lieu of the exclusionary rule); Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665, 756-
57 (1970).
153. See Jones, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 9 ST. Tax. L.J. 17 (1966).
seem to place unconscionable burdens on the federal prosecuting au-
thorities.
Although difficult, it is doubtless possible for the prosectuion to
establish that the evidence was not garnered from the tax returns, as-
suming, of course, that it was not. This presupposes that the defend-
ant has raised the issue of the admissibility of the evidence, whereupon
the prosecution must affirmatively show that it is admissible.154 In
general terms, the prosecution must demonstrate an independent
source155 or origin.'15  It could, for example, show that evidence of
gambling activities was discovered as the result of information totally
unrelated to inspection of the income tax return, and if the prosecu-
tion succeeds, the taint will be dissipated.' 57 In this manner, evidence
contained in an individual's income tax return obtained in violation
of the privilege against self-incrimination will be accorded the same
treatment as that given evidence obtained in derogation of the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The other way in which the government may free its case from
the taint of inadmissible evidence obtained from tax returns is to dem-
onstrate that the defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right in sup-
plying the information. Garner simply said that presuming waiver
from a silent record would be impermissible, 5 ' and governmental pro-
cedures for showing such a waiver were not discussed. General rules
for establishing waiver of constitutional rights, however, have been es-
tablished in previous cases. Johnson v. Zerbst'5 9 stated the rule:
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether
there has been an intelligent waiver .. .must depend, in each
case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused.160
Establishing a waiver in a particular case is therefore a matter
of examination of the particular circumstances involved, and here, too,
154. United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 488 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd 316 U.S.
114 (1942); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (dictum).
155. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
156. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (dictum); see Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d
629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950).
157. See, e.g., Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 62 (1946) (knowledge of docu-
ment obtained prior to and independently of action in seizing document in violation
of the Fourth Amendment); Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit, 55 CGuM. L.C. &
P.S. 307 (1964).
158. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 8. See
text accompanying notes 124-137 supra.
159. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
160. Id. at 464.
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the government has the burden of proof.161 It is clear that a statement
printed on the income tax return, to the effect that the informant waives
all Fifth Amendment privileges to the statements supplied, would not
insure the finding of waiver.' 62 There can be no per se rule regarding
a waiver, and the determination must be left to future cases on an ad
hoc basis, 6 3 with a heavy emphasis on a presumption in favor of indi-
vidual rights.
Propriety of Imposing the Use Restriction-Exclusionary Rule
In Marchetti v. United States,' the Court rejected the govern-
ment's proposal that it prescribe a use restriction on the disclosures in
the wagering excise tax returns.' 65 The Court held the circumstances
were inappropriate because not only would a use restriction be contrary
to congressional intent, it would seriously hamper enforcement of state
gambling statutes. Notwithstanding the factual differences between
the two cases, it would seem reasonable to test Garner's imposition of
the use restriction against the criteria provided in Marchetti.
Marchetti found that Congress had intended information gathered
by the wagering excise tax scheme to be made available to interested
prosecuting authorities. 6 6  Section 6107 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 6 7 now repealed, provided that lists of those paying such excise
taxes be maintained in the principal internal revenue office in each
revenue district. The lists were deemed public records, to be fur-
nished to any prosecuting authority upon payment of a nominal fee,
and this procedure had been the consistent practice of the Internal
Revenue Service.' 68
161. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
162. See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1006 (1968) (dictum), where the court said: "the mere signing of a
boiler-plate statement to the effect that a defendant is knowingly waiving his rights
will not discharge the government's burden....
163. Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 946 (1967).
164. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
165. The Court stated that a use restriction would be an "attractive and appar-
ently practical resolution" of the problem presented but deemed the circumstances in-
appropriate for such an imposition. 390 U.S. at 58. Any restrictions to be imposed
so as to make the statutory scheme enforceable were entrusted to Congress. Id.
at 58-60.
166. Id. at 58-60.
167. Although INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6107 had been enacted prior to the
excise tax on wagering, Marchetti found that Congress "understood and wished"
prosecuting authorities to be provided with lists. 390 U.S. at 59, n.16. Section 6107
was repealed by Act of October 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 203(a), 82 Stat. 1235.
168. Caplin, The Gambling Business and Federal Taxes, 8 CRihc. & DELiN. 371,
378 (1962).
Although not raised by the court, the question arises in Garner
whether such use restrictions would be contrary to congressional in-
tent. In section 6103(a)(1) of the code, Congress propounded what
can only be deemed an ambivalent position, providing that:
[r]eturns made with respect to taxes . . . shall constitute public
records; but, except as hereinafter provided in this section, they
shall be open only upon order of the President and under rules
and regulations prescribed by the Secretary . . . and approved by
the President. 169
Congressional intent is not shown by this statute. The executive
branch, through the Treasury Department, is granted the authority to
determine the extent to which tax returns may be used by the govern-
ment. Pursuant to this authority, the regulations provide that such
returns are open to inspection by a United States attorney in the course
of his official duties.' 70  These returns may in turn be employed in
any court, provided that the United States has an interest in the re-
sult.' The only condition attached is that uses of the return are
limited to purposes for which it was furnished.
17 2
It can be argued, however, that the regulations infer an indication
of congressional intent. Congress, if it did not approve of the regula-
tions promulgated by the Treasury Department, could express its con-
trary intent through specific legislation. 73  The regulations, however,
are capable of two interpretations. Under the first, they may be seen
as contemplating all litigation, tax-related or not. Alternately, the
thrust of the regulations may be characterized as ambiguous, and use
of the returns under such an interpretation should be restricted to tax-
related proceedings. Although a number of cases have upheld the in-
troduction of tax returns where the prosecution was for a nontax-related
offense, 7 1 they did not address themselves to the individual's Fifth
Amendment privilege. Moreover, the age of these decisions-three or
four decades old by now-indicates that they became law prior to re-
cent decisions extending the Fifth Amendment's protections.
Supporting the contention that use of returns should be restricted
to tax-related proceedings is section 6103(b) (2), dealing with the use
of federal income tax returns by the states. It provides:
169. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6103(a)(1).
170. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-1(g) (1961).
171. Id. § 301.6103(a)-1(h) (1961).
172. Id.
173. See Fribourg Nay. Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 283 (1966). But
see Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 185 (1957).
174. E.g., United States v. Rollnick, 91 F.2d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1937) (mail
fraud); Lewis v. United States, 38 F.2d 406, 413 (9th Cir. 1930) (same); Gibson v.
United States, 31 F.2d 19, 22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 866 (1929) (National
Prohibition Act violation); Lewy v. United States, 29 F.2d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 1928),
cert. denied, 279 U.S. 850 (1929) (mail fraud).
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All income returns filed with respect to the taxes imposed . ..
shall be open to inspection by an official, body, or commission,
lawfully charged with the administration of any State tax law, if
the inspection is for the purpose of such administration ....
Any information thus secured . . .may be used only for the ad-
ministration of the tax laws of such State. .... 175
Thus, an affirmative legislative mandate limits the states in their use
of federal tax returns, restricting such use to tax-related offenses. The
regulatory rather than the prosecutorial role of the state is empha-
sized, and it follows that identical reasoning should apply to the federal
government. Since the Internal Revenue Code is primarily a regula-
tory scheme, 17 the regulations should be construed to effectuate this
basic purpose and their provisions should be deemed applicable to tax-
related offenses only. Viewed in this manner, the imposition of a use
restriction will not thwart congressional intent, thus satisfying the first
element of the Marchetti test concerning such restricions-a consistency
with congressional intent.
The Marchetti Court feared that the imposition of a use restriction
would seriously limit enforcement of state gambling statutes.177  The
states, in subsequent prosecutions laboring under such restrictions,
would have to prove that "their evidence was untainted by any con-
nection with information obtained as a consequence of the wagering
taxes .... ,,178 The imposition of a use restriction for income tax
returns, however, will satisfy the second requirement of the Marchetti
test; it will not seriously hamper enforcement of state revenue statutes.
Unlike section 6107 of the Internal Revenue Code, at issue in Mar-
chetti, section 6103(b)(2) bars the states from inspecting federal in-
come tax returns for all purposes other than to enforce their own tax
statutes.'
7 9
The dissent in Garner argued that the Supreme Court decision in
175. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6103(b) (2) (emphasis added). The legislative
purpose behind the enactment appears from a review of the prior statutes on the point.
The Revenue Act of 1934 had made the information contained in the income tax
returns "public records" and completely open to public inspection. Revenue Act of
1934, ch. 277, § 55(b), 48 Stat. 698. This section was quickly amended to provide
for inspection by a state "only for purposes of, and may be used only for, the ad-
ministration of [its] tax laws." Act of April 19, 1935, ch. 74, § 55(b), 49 Stat. 158.
The debate surrounding the amendment indicates that the primary aim was to enable
the states to enforce their tax laws, without completely abrogating the individual's
right to privacy. 79 CONG. Rc. 3389-3413 (1935).
176. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
177. For applicable state gambling statutes see Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39, 44 n.5 (1968).
178. Id. at 59; accord, Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 69 (1968); cf.
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1968). See text accompanying notes
153-157 supra.
179. See text accompanying notes 166-75 supra.
.April 1973"1
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
California v. Byers, s' ° holding that the California "hit and run" statute
did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination, foreclosed any
Ninth Circuit adoption of use restrictions.' 8 ' The decision in Byers,
however, rested upon the premise that the information could be re-
quired because the possibility of incrimination did not meet the "ap-
preciable danger" requirement. 82 In Garner, on the other hand, the
court is not concerned with whether an individual resists the self-dis-
closure scheme but what use is made of the information once disclosed.
The dissent failed to grasp the basic issue in the case, and argued that
because the initial disclosures could not be resisted on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds, their subsequent use would be constitutionally inof-
fensive because the information is "volunteered.' 83
Conclusion
In order to comply with Garner, there exists the possibility of
amending the Internal Revenue Code to bring it into direct agreement
with the court's decision. There is ample precedent for this type of
action. After the Supreme Court held in Haynes v. United States' that
the registration provision of the National Firearms Act violated the
Fifth Amendment privilege, Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of
1968."85 This amended the National Firearms Act to cure the defect.
Rigid restrictions were placed on the use of information collected,'
and furthermore, as a matter of administration, the data filed was not
to be available to local, state or federal agencies.' 87 Precisely the same
enactment is needed in the field of information contained in an indi-
vidual's income tax returns, at least when it is being used against him
180. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
181. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 10-11
(Wallace, J., dissenting).
182. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra. The question in Byers was
whether the statute, without a use restriction, violated the privilege against self-
incrimination. 402 U.S. at 427. An alternative ground for the decision was that the
disclosures required were not testimonial or communicative within the meaning of the
Constitutional privilege. Id. at 432.
183. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) at 6-7.
184. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
185. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, Title II, Sec. 201, 82 Stat.
1227, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 5810-48.
186. "No information or evidence obtained from an application, registration, or
records required to be submitted or retained by a natural person in order to comply
with any provision of this chapter or regulations issued thereunder, shall . . . be
used, directly or indirectly, as evidence against that person in a criminal proceeding
with respect to a violation of law occurring prior to or concurrently with the filing
of the application or registration, or the compiling of the records containing the in-
formation or evidence." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 5848.
187. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606 (1971).
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in later, nontax-related, criminal proceeding. Such an enactment would
have the effect of codifying the result obtained in Garner.
In either case, income tax return information will be prohibited
in a nontax-related, criminal prosecution unless the government can
show a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination at the time
the return was filed. Also, assuming the individual's income tax re-
turn was acquired, some of the evidence introduced in the subsequent
proceeding may be subject to the exclusionary rule as "fruit of the
poisonous tree." This is the lesson of Garner. The two limitations
may raise considerable barriers to this type of prosecution in the fu-
ture. The best approach would be for Congress to recognize that the
regulatory rather than the prosecutorial function of the government is
paramount in the area of income taxation and enact an amendment to
the Internal Revenue Code restricting the use of the information col-
lected in tax returns thereby prohibiting its dissemination to other agen-
cies for use in nontax-related proceedings.
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